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THE QUESTION OF ADEQUATE 
REPRESENTATION IN THE TYSON COURT’S 
DENIAL OF INTERVENTION 
Nick Feinstein* 
Abstract: In 2005, the State of Oklahoma (State) brought a suit against 
Tyson Foods, Inc. for the improper disposal of poultry waste in the Illi-
nois River Watershed (IRW). Approximately four years later, the Chero-
kee Nation (Nation) asserted its interests in the IRW and its right to in-
tervene under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
district court found that the Nation had delayed too long and denied the 
motion as untimely. On appeal, this decision was upheld based on the fact 
that the Nation could never have reasonably believed that it was being 
adequately represented by the State. This Comment argues that the Na-
tion’s belief that it was adequately represented was in fact reasonable. 
Introduction 
 In recent years, poultry consumption in the United States has 
grown steadily, surpassing pork and beef.1 In 2006, Americans con-
sumed eighty-seven pounds of chicken per capita.2 To meet this de-
mand, large-scale poultry producers have expanded the size of their 
operations, but not without increasing risk to the environment.3 The 
large excesses of waste generated by poultry farms can leak phospho-
rous and other pollutants that threaten nearby streams and rivers.4 Be-
cause poultry production is highly concentrated in specific geographic 
regions, the problem of waste is exacerbated in certain areas.5 
 One region of heavy poultry production is the Illinois River Water-
shed (IRW), an area that spans the border of Oklahoma and Arkansas.6 
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Large-scale farms in and around the IRW provide about two percent of 
poultry in the United States.7 According to some, however, supplying 
the country’s poultry needs comes at the expense of the local environ-
ment.8 Environmentalists claim that the common practice of reusing 
poultry waste as fertilizer has transformed the IRW into a “murky, 
sludgy mess.”9 In 2005, the problem prompted the State of Oklahoma 
(State) to sue the largest poultry producers in the area, seeking dam-
ages and an injunction to stop further pollution of the IRW.10 
 On June 13, 2005, the State sued Tyson Foods, Inc. in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma alleging 
“injury to the lands, waters, and biota of the IRW,” as a result of im-
proper disposal of poultry waste.11 In July of 2009, however, the court 
dismissed the State’s claims for monetary damages, finding that the 
Cherokee Nation (Nation) was a required party under Rule 19 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.12 In an attempt to restore damage 
claims to the case, the Nation filed a motion to intervene on September 
2, 2009, only nineteen days before the trial’s scheduled start date.13 The 
district court denied the motion as untimely and the trial proceeded 
only on the State’s claims for injunctive relief.14 
 In Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc. the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court’s denial, 
finding that the Nation’s failure to intervene in the four years since the 
initial complaint constituted an undue delay.15 The court measured the 
length of the delay from the time that the Nation was aware of the liti-
gation and on notice that its interests were not being adequately repre-
sented by the State.16 The court decided that the Nation could not have 
believed that its interests were being represented because it was not 
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2010). 
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mentioned in the State’s complaint.17 Therefore, there was no valid 
reason for the Nation to wait until just days before trial to file its motion 
to intervene.18 
 The dissenting opinion in Tyson espoused a broader view.19 It ar-
gued that the State and Nation were both bringing CERCLA claims as 
trustees for the same natural resources and thus had the same ultimate 
objectives.20 Thus, the Nation could have reasonably believed that the 
State was representing its interests until July 22, 2009, when the district 
court determined that the Nation was a required party.21 
 This Comment argues that the dissent’s assertion is correct; the 
majority’s exceedingly narrow approach ignores the common purpose 
for which the State and the Nation both sought damages: to restore 
and protect the natural resources of the IRW.22 By disregarding the Na-
tion’s reasonable belief, the court deprived both parties of their most 
convenient opportunity to recover damages.23 Although the decision’s 
impact may not prove to be far reaching, it is a setback for the rehabili-
tation of the IRW. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 The IRW, which covers approximately one million acres in Okla-
homa and Arkansas, is host to a number of large-scale poultry produc-
ers, including Tyson and farmers with which it contracts to grow poul-
try.24 Every year, thousands of tons of waste are generated by the 
poultry farming industry in the IRW.25 Both the State and the Nation 
claim ownership in these lands.26 
 The State’s initial complaint was filed in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on June 13, 2005 and in-
cluded nine causes of action, including two claims under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) seeking recovery costs for past and future damages to the 
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IRW.27 It also sought damages and injunctive relief for claims of nui-
sance, trespass, and unjust enrichment.28 Finally, the complaint sought 
an injunction and civil penalties based on Oklahoma state law.29 
 The Nation was not named as a party in the lawsuit, but demon-
strated its concern and awareness of the issue as early as March 2005, 
before the claim was filed.30 Thus, the Nation maintained communica-
tion with the State and Tyson regarding the lawsuit but did not become 
officially involved.31 Among other concerns, the Nation hoped to avoid 
testing the validity of its interests in land and natural resources in the 
IRW.32 
 Over two years into the litigation, the district court issued a sched-
uling order setting the trial for September of 2009.33 On October 31, 
2008, Tyson filed a Rule 19 motion to dismiss for failure to join a re-
quired party, based on documents revealed in discovery showing a po-
tential conflict between the State’s and Nation’s interests in the IRW.34 
Tyson asserted that the Nation’s ownership claims over the IRW made it 
a required party, and that the case should be dismissed to avoid subject-
ing Tyson to duplicative or inconsistent judgments.35 While this motion 
was pending, the Nation entered into an agreement with the Attorney 
General of Oklahoma, authorizing the State to prosecute claims relat-
ing to the Tyson case on behalf of the Nation.36 
 On July 22, 2009, the district court granted Tyson’s motion in part, 
dismissing all of the State’s damages claims.37 It found that the Nation 
was a required party and that the agreement was not valid; therefore it 
could not proceed with the State’s damages claims without risking dou-
                                                                                                                      
27 Id. at 1225–26. 
28 Id. at 1227. 
29 Id. 
30 Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1227. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. The Nation’s Principal Chief stated that the Nation’s water rights in the IRW 
predated the existence of the United States, but the Nation did not wish to test the extent 
of these rights in court. See id. at 1227–28. 
33 Id. at 1228. An order on November 15, 2007 set discovery to be completed on March 
2, 2009 with trial to begin September of the same year; an order on April 24, 2009 set the 
specific trial date for September 21, 2009. Id. 
34 Id. at 1228; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. 
35 Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1228; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1) (defining a required party); Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 19(b) (allowing dismissal when joining a required party is not feasible). The 
Nation could not be joined involuntarily due to tribal sovereign immunity. Tyson, 619 F.3d 
at 1228. 
36 Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1229. 
37 Id. 
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ble recovery or infringing on the Nation’s own right to seek damages.38 
The court also decided that the State did not have standing to seek re-
covery for damages to the Nation’s interests in the IRW.39 The State’s 
claims for injunctive relief survived the motion.40 
 On September 2, 2009, the Nation filed a motion to intervene, 
bringing claims under CERCLA and federal nuisance law.41 The Nation 
sought damages and injunctive relief based on its own interests in the 
IRW.42 Anticipating that its own damages claims could be revived, the 
State filed a motion to postpone the upcoming trial date for 120 days 
and a response in support of the Nation’s intervention.43 Tyson op-
posed the motion to intervene, claiming that it was untimely and that 
joining the Nation would cause excessive inconvenience by requiring 
additional discovery and litigation of a multitude of new issues.44 The 
State and the Nation both asserted that before the court’s Rule 19 deci-
sion, the Nation believed that its interests were being protected by the 
State, and the motion was therefore timely.45 
 The district court denied the motion to intervene, stating that 
permitting the Nation to join would prejudice the original parties, and 
that the Nation was free to raise claims against Tyson separately.46 On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s denial of the 
Nation’s motion to intervene.47 
II. Legal Background 
 Denial of a motion to intervene is “subject to immediate review if it 
prevents the applicant from becoming a party to an action.”48 The 
Court of Appeals thus had jurisdiction over the ruling on timeliness.49 
Normally, such rulings are reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion stan-
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dard.50 When a lower court has applied the law improperly, however, de 
novo review is required.51 
 Rule 19(a), which prompted the district court’s dismissal of the 
State’s damages claims, requires parties who claim interests related to 
an action be joined if the court could not properly resolve the dispute 
in their absence.52 Rule 19 is closely related to Rule 24, which gives in-
terested parties the right to intervene; a party that has the right to join 
under Rule 24 will also be considered a required party under Rule 19.53 
 Rule 24(a) provides that, “[o]n timely motion, the court must per-
mit anyone to intervene who” claims an interest subject to the action.54 
Thus, timeliness is a required element for a motion to intervene.55 The 
Tenth Circuit has identified a non-exhaustive list of factors in a timeli-
ness determination, “including the length of time since the applicant 
knew of his interest in the case, prejudice to the existing parties, preju-
dice to the applicant, and the existence of any unusual circum-
stances.”56 
 Determining the length of time that the Nation delayed before 
seeking to intervene proved the most contentious issue in Tyson. Sev-
eral circuit courts have held that “[t]he date on which the party seeking 
intervention became aware of the litigation is by itself not always rele-
vant.”57 Rather, the appropriate measure of the potential intervenor’s 
delay begins only when it becomes aware that its interests are not being 
represented adequately by the current parties.58 Thus courts commonly 
toll the length of the delay from the time when the movant no longer 
reasonably believed that its interests were being adequately repre-
sented.59 
                                                                                                                      
50 Coalition, 100 F.3d at 840. 
51 See, e.g., Kretzinger v. First Bank of Waynoka, 103 F.3d 943, 946 (10th Cir. 1996). 
52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 619 F.3d 
1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2010). Rule 19(b) allows the court to dismiss a case when a required 
party is not joined. 
53 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a); Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149, 162 
(2d Cir. 2010). 
54 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (emphasis added). Rule 24(a)(2) also precludes a party from 
intervening if that party’s interests are already being adequately represented. Id. 
55 See Coalition, 100 F.3d at 840. 
56 Sanguine, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir. 1984). The 
first factor is the primary focus of this comment. 
57 Legal Aid Soc’y of Alameda Co. v. Dunlop, 618 F.2d 48, 50 (9th Cir. 1980). 
58 Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1232 (adopting the test used by other circuits); see, e.g., Dunlop, 
618 F.2d at 50. 
59 See, e.g., Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 64 F.3d 316, 322 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e do 
not expect a party to petition for intervention in instances in which the potential interve-
nor has no reason to believe its interests are not being properly represented.”). 
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 The question of adequate representation under Rule 19 and Rule 
24(a)(2) has been a matter of disagreement between circuit courts.60 
The 1966 Amendment Note states that, “[t]he representation whose 
adequacy comes into question under [Rule 24] is not confined to for-
mal representation.”61 One such situation in which a party’s interests 
are presumed to be protected adequately is when it shares the same 
final objectives with a party already in the lawsuit.62 
 Because adequate representation may prevent a party from inter-
vening under Rule 24(a)(2), most of the precedent dealing with this 
congruence of objectives consists of cases in which such representation 
would preclude otherwise allowable intervention.63 In United States v. 
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics, Corp., for example, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld a denial of intervention because the appli-
cants were already adequately represented in the litigation.64 That case 
involved environmental groups attempting to intervene in an action 
brought by the United States against a chemicals and plastics corpora-
tion for illegal waste disposal.65 In reaching its decision, the court rec-
ognized a presumption of adequate representation when a potential 
intervenor shares the interest of a governmental party in litigation.66 
 In similar cases, however, courts have found slightly diverging in-
terests, and therefore a right to intervene.67 In Coalition of Arizona/New 
Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth v. Department of Interior, a wild-
life photographer attempted to intervene in an action brought to chal-
lenge protection of the Mexican Spotted Owl.68 The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals observed that the Department of the Interior was 
necessarily obligated to serve the broad public interest, while the pho-
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Rule 24(a), 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279, 291 (1990). 
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65 Id. at 969–70. 
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tographer’s purpose was limited in this instance to the protection of 
owls.69 Thus the photographer had the right to intervene.70 
 The dissent in Tyson focused primarily on the claims brought by 
both the State and the Nation under CERCLA.71 Thus, it is important to 
understand certain provisions of the statute upon which these claims 
were based. One purpose of CERCLA is to impose liability for the costs 
of repairing and preventing environmental harm caused by hazardous 
waste on the parties who benefit from its disposal.72 Regarding such re-
covery, CERCLA states that parties will be liable to the United States or 
to any state or Indian tribe that controls the affected natural re-
sources.73 Further, “[t]he President, or the authorized representative of 
any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural re-
sources to recover for such damages.”74 The same provision provides 
that damages recovered by a party acting as trustee may only be used “to 
restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources.”75 
                                                                                                                     
 In United States v. Asarco Inc., the court interpreted this provision to 
mean that recovery under CERCLA “is not for the benefit of a given 
party, but goes to the trustee as the fiduciary to accomplish the stated 
goals.”76 In that case, the United States, the State of Idaho, and the 
Coeur D’Alene Tribe sued mining companies for environmental harms 
under CERCLA.77 After Idaho and the Tribe settled with the defen-
dants, the federal government proceeded, but the court stated that the 
amount of the settlement would be deducted from the damages ulti-
mately awarded because all three parties were acting as trustees of the 
same natural resources.78 
 Under the interpretation in Asarco, an individual trustee can sue for 
the entire amount of the claim, and the apportionment of damages 
among co-trustees can be settled separately if necessary.79 Therefore, 
 
69 Id. at 845. 
70 Id. at 846. 
71 Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1240. 
72 OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir. 
1997). See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006). 
73 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 United States v. Asarco Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Idaho 2005). In this 
case, the judge reversed his own prior decision from Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., 
280 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Idaho 2003). 
77 See Coeur D’Alene, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1102. 
78 Asarco, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1069. 
79 Id. at 1068. 
2012] Intervention Rights Under Rule 24 37 
one trustee’s right to recovery is not usurped if another files a claim.80 
The trustee system of recovery, according to the Asarco court, facilitates 
CERCLA’s primary goal “to restore and make whole the environment 
for the protection of the public and guard against destruction and dam-
ages to our natural resources.”81 
III. Analysis 
 In deciding Tyson, the majority analyzed each of the timeliness fac-
tors to determine whether the district court had abused its discretion.82 
It reasoned that the Nation was aware of the case at the outset of litiga-
tion and should have known that its interests were not represented by 
the State, yet it had not taken action.83 Further, the court concluded 
that the likely inconvenience of intervention would amount to signifi-
cant prejudice to Tyson, but that potential prejudice to the Nation re-
sulting from a denial was “more speculative than real.”84 Finding no 
unusual circumstances weighing against the district court’s decision, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.85 The court’s analysis of 
the first factor is the primary subject of this Comment. 
 The majority’s ruling on the first factor hinged on the view that the 
Nation knew that its interests were not being adequately represented by 
the State.86 In answering the adequate representation question, the 
court employed a narrow reading of the State’s initial complaint.87 It 
reasoned that because the State sought recovery in its complaint for its 
own past and future costs, but not for costs incurred by the Nation, 
there was “nothing in the record suggest[ing] that the Nation could 
have reasonably believed that [its] interests would be adequately pro-
tected.”88 Thus, the Nation could not have reasonably believed that its 
interest in monetary damages was being represented at any point in the 
litigation, and its lengthy delay was unjustified.89 
                                                                                                                      
80 See id. 
81 Id. at 1067. 
82 Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 619 F.3d 1223, 1232–35 (10th Cir. 
2010). 
83 Id. at 1235. 
84 Id. at 1237–38. 
85 Id. at 1238–39. 
86 Id. at 1233. 
87 See id. 
88 Tyson, 619 F.3d. at 1234. 
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 Stating that the district court applied the law improperly, the dis-
sent in Tyson used a de novo standard of review.90 In analyzing the first 
factor, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s holding that the Nation 
could not have reasonably believed that its interests were being repre-
sented by the State.91 The dissent argued that both the State and the 
Nation brought CERCLA claims motivated by the same objective; “they 
both sought to recover monetary damages from Tyson in order to com-
pensate for and repair the damage it allegedly caused to the IRW.”92 In 
the dissent’s view, the Nation’s belief that it was being properly repre-
sented was justified by the common goal of recovering damages.93 
 The dissent therefore measured the Nation’s delay from the date 
that the district court found the Nation to be a required party.94 It sug-
gested that the lower court’s decision did not follow the interpretation 
in Asarco, and therefore was unexpected by the Nation.95 Had the Na-
tion relied on Asarco, it could have reasonably believed that the State 
would pursue monetary damages which could be distributed to the Na-
tion later.96 The Nation only became aware of the district court’s view 
months before the expected trial date.97 
 The dissent did not attempt to answer whether the Nation actually 
was adequately represented by the State prior to the district court’s Rule 
19 decision.98 This is indeed a difficult question due to the unclear 
status of the Nation’s interests in the IRW.99 The majority’s decision, 
however, dismissed even the possibility that the Nation believed it had 
such representation.100 Its determination is overly narrow, and fails to 
take into account the common benefit provided by environmental re-
covery under CERCLA.101 
 The majority based its decision on the fact that the Nation is not 
explicitly named as a beneficiary of damages in the State’s com-
                                                                                                                      
90 Id. at 1240 (Tacha, J., dissenting). The dissent’s analysis of each factor came out in 
favor of the Nation. Only its opinion regarding the first factor is addressed in this com-
men
t 1240. 
19 F.3d. at 1241 (Tacha, J., dissenting). 




93 See id. at 1240–41. 
94 Tyson, 6
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 1240. 
97 See id at 1229 (majority opinion). 
98 Id. at 1241 n.2 (Tacha, J., dissenting). 
99 See id. at 1227–28 (majority opin
100 See Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1233. 
101 See supra text accompanying note 81. 
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plaint.102 But this approach glosses over the necessary examination of 
both parties’ interests, as demonstrated in cases like Coalition and 
Hooker.103 In Hooker, for example, environmental groups were denied 
intervention when the initial complainants shared the common goal of 
protecting the Niagara River from hazardous contaminants.104 Likewise 
in Tyson, the Nation and State both sought to protect the same natural 
resources from waste.105 Following this reasoning, the Nation may have 
reasonably believed that its interest in protecting the IRW was being 
represented, regardless of its absence in the State’s complaint. 
                                                                                                                     
 In Coalition, however, the court found that an owl enthusiast’s ob-
jectives were clearly distinguishable from the Interior’s obligation to 
serve the public good, and therefore his interests were not adequately 
represented.106 There was no such divergence between the interests of 
the State and the Nation in Tyson.107 If viewed in light of Asarco, the be-
lief that the Nation’s interests were being adequately represented was 
even more plausible.108 
 Under the Asarco court’s interpretation of CERCLA, damages 
awarded to either the State or the Nation would have been held in trust 
for benefit of the IRW’s natural resources.109 Thus, with regard to CER-
CLA damages, either party could be considered to represent the oth-
er’s interests. 
 The protracted litigation and the combination of State, Tribal, and 
private parties created a highly unique fact pattern in Tyson. Indeed, it is 
unclear to what extent the precedent will affect future disputes. How-
ever, similar circumstances are not unforeseeable given the unsettled 
state of American Indian water rights.110 In Tyson, the decision made it 
far more difficult for either the State or the Nation to obtain monetary 
damages even if Tyson’s waste disposal violated CERCLA.111 The re-
quirement of timeliness is imposed to prevent undue delay; it should 
 
102 See supra text accompanying note 81. 
103 See cases cited supra notes 63–69. 
104 United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 970 (2d Cir. 1984). 
105 See Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1240 (Tacha, J., dissenting). 
106 Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Cntys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 F.3d 
837, 845 (10th Cir. 1996). 
107 See Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1241 (Tacha, J., dissenting). 
108 See id. 
109 See United States v. Asarco Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Idaho 2005). 
110 See generally Jana L. Walker & Susan M. Williams, Indian Reserved Water Rights, 5 Nat. 
Resources & Env’t, 6, 6 (1990–91) (describing the “controversy over tribal water rights”). 
111 See Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1242. 
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not, as in this case, prevent a required party from seeking damages 
based on the initial belief that it was being adequately represented.112 
Conclusion 
 As of August, 2011, the State’s surviving claims for injunctive relief 
against Tyson were still pending.113 A favorable decision from the dis-
trict court would be a significant step towards protecting the health of 
the IRW’s natural resources from the local poultry industry’s waste dis-
posal.114 However, even if the State’s claims are successful, both the State 
and Nation will likely have to initiate another costly lawsuit if they wish 
to seek monetary damages.115 Still, the Nation is not precluded from 
filing a subsequent suit against Tyson for damages, and it has not ruled 
out doing so.116 Tyson’s precedential effect may ultimately be marginal; 
however, it serves as a warning to other parties content to sit on their 
right to intervene with the belief that they are being adequately repre-
sented. 
 
112 See 7C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1916 
(3d ed. 2007). 
113 Curtis Killman, Ex-Attorney General Puzzled at Poultry Suit Ruling Delay, Tulsa World, 
(Aug. 29, 2011, 7:52:17 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=11& 
articleid=20110829_11_A1_CUTLIN991989. 
114 See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
115 Tyson, 619 F.3d at 1242. 
116 Robert J. Smith, No Ruling Year After Poultry Trial; Lack of Decision No Surprise, Envi-
ronmental Case Parties Agree, Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Feb. 22, 2011, at 8 (“Cherokee Na-
tion Attorney General Diane Hammons said in an e-mail last week that the tribe has been 
approached by lawyers who want to represent the tribe in a separate lawsuit against the 
companies.”). 
